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THE ATTITUDE OF PUBLIC POLICY TOWARDS
THE CONTRACTS OF HEIRS EXPECTANT AND
REVERSIONER.
WHAT IS PUBLIC POLICY?
Government is dependent upon social organization, but neither
government nor the social fabric constitute the State, for both
may entirely change or disintegrate and the State maintain its
identity. The State is the body politic; the sovereign; the recipient
of the individual's freedom, and the trustee thereof for the citizen.
Government is the beneficent exercise of this trust. The social
fabric is the means whereby this trust is exercised or preserved.
The public weal is the health of the social fabric. Public policy
is the requirement that the social fabric shall be maintained in-
violate.
When acts of the individual are prohibited as being opposed
to public policy, their intrinsic morality or immorality is not con-
sidered, nor is their effect on the individual, but solely their effect
to impair the social fabric. But one question is presented: Does
their consummation tend to injuriously affect the public weal?
If the question be answered affirmatively, then the performance
of the act is impliedly forbidden to the citizen, and any obligation
arising from the act is unenforceable. If the general tendency of
such acts is injurious, then public policy regards them with disfavor.
Obligations arising therefrom are presumptively invalid and it is
incumbent upon him who would enforce such obligation to show
that its effect is not injurious.
But the structure of the social fabric may so change that the
acts of individuals which once threatened its well-being may cease
to affect it in any particular, and hence the public policy of the
eighteenth may not be the policy of the twentieth century; -nor the
public policy of England the policy of America.
T1HE EFFECT OF CONTRACTS OF EXPECTANTS AND REVERSIONERS-HOW
FAR IDENTICAL.
Before we undertake the consideration of public policy towards
the contracts of reversioner and heir expectant, we will make some
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examination into the relation of such contracts the one to the other.
The reversioner has an estate on a future contingency, viz: that he
outlives the tenant for years. His interest during the tenant's life
is present and may be conveyed at law. The heir expectant has no
present interest in his ancestor's estate. It is a mere expectancy,
existing not by right in him, but by the ancestor's favor. It cannot
be conveyed at law, but an attempted conveyance is recognized by
the Chancery courts as an equitable assignment; it is considered
to be a contract to convey the estate of the ancestor when it shall
vest in the expectant, and as such it may be specifically enforced.1
The effect of both classes of contracts being identical inasmuch as
the fee is diverted from the heir, it follows that public policy to-
wards both must be the same, and while considering such policy
they may be considered as identical.
2
1In Carleton v. Leighton, 3 Meriv., 667 (I8O5), the Lord Chancellor said:
"That the expectancy of an heir presumptive or apparent (the fee simple
being in the ancestor) was not an interest or a possibility, nor was capable of
being made the subject of assignment or contract; that the cases cited werA
cases of covenant to settle or assign property which should fall to the cove-
nantor; when the interest which passed by the covenant was not an interest
in the land but a tight under the contract"; and in 1833, Lyde v. Mynn, r
Idyl. & K., 683, it was held that, "What Carleton v. Leighton actually decides
* * * is this: Not that a person may not validly deal with an expectancy
and bind himself to convey it when his title shall accrue, but only that such
obligation is merely personal. He is bound and he may be compelled to
perform the contract when he can." See, also, Hobson v. Trevor, 2 P. Wins.
191; Wright v. Wright, i Ves. Sr., 409; Whitfield v. Fausset, i Ves. Sr., 387;
Medcalf v. Ives, I Atr., 63; Beckley v. Newland, 2 P. Wms., 182; Carleton v.
Leighton, Supra, reporter's note; Wethered v. Wethere, 2 Sim, 183; Har-
wood v. Tooke, 3 Sim, I92; Story, Equity furis., Io4oc; Fitzgerali v. Vestal,
4 Srieed, 258; McDonald v. McDonald, 5 Jones Eq. (N. C.), 211; Mastin v.
Marlow, 65 N, C., 695; Havens tr. Thompson, 26 N. J. Eq., 383; Barham v.
McKneely, 89 Ga., 812; Stover v. Eyeleshitner, 4 Abb. Dec., 309; Steele v.
Frierson, 85 Tenn., 430; In re Garcelon, 1O4 Cal., 57o; Walker v. Walker, 67
Pa. St., 185; Kuhn': Appeal, 163 Pa. St., 438; Power's Appeal, 63 Pa. St.,
443; Bityler vt. Com., 40 Pa. St., 37; Wilson's Estate, 2 Pa. St., 325; Parsons
v. Ely, 45 Ill., 232; Bishop v. Davenport, 58 Ill., 1o5; Clendenning i). Wyatt,
54 Kan., 5s3; Hale v. Holton, 35 S. W., 843.
"It was old, I conceive, necessary for the purpose of bringing the cast
within the old law as to bargains with expectant heirs, that the so-called heirs
should have any vested or defined reservations." Earl of Aylesford v. Morris,
L R., 8 Ch., 484. "The doctrine applies * * * not merely to heits dealing
with expectancies, but to reversioners and remainder-men dealing with
property already vested in them, but of which the enjoyment is future."
Story, Eq. Juris., Sec. 337.
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THE ENGLISH RULES GOVERNING SUCH CONTRACTS.
In the earlier English cases these contracts were looked upon
with disfavor, as it was considered that their general effect upon
the public weal was injurious. Accordingly, the presumption was
against their validity, and the burden of proof to establish such
validity was placed upon him who sought to enforce the contract.
As was said by Lord Chancellor Eldon in Davis v. Duke of Marl-
borough (2 Swan., 1O8, 139): "If a person has dealt with an
heir apparent, for an interest of which he is not in present posses-
sion, this court extends to the heir the benefit of this principle
with reference to those dealing with him, that it does not rest on
him to show that the bargain was unreasonable and improvident,
but on them to show that it was reasonable." And Lord Chan-
cellor Hardwicke said in Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen (2 Ves.,
Sr., 124, 156): "The last head of fraud on which there has been
relief, is that which infects catching bargains with heirs, reversion-
ers or expectants, in the life of the father, etc., against which relief
always is extended. * * * There is always fraud presumed or
inferred from the circumstances or conditions of the parties con-
tracting; weakness on one side, usury on the other, or extortion or
advantage taken of that weakness." And it was held that a third
element must be shown: that the consideration was full and ade-
quate. As was said by Sir William Grant, M. R., in Gowland v.
De Faria (17 Ves., Jr., 20): "It is incumbent upon those who
have dealt with an expectant heir relative to his reversionary interest,
to make good the bargain; that is, to be able to show that a full
and adequate consideration was paid."
But it is evident that the presumption of fraud does not arise
from the fact that one is contracting for delivery of an expectancy
or that he is seeking to relieve necessitous circumstances by dis-
counting the future, for fraud is not presumed in the case of
ordinary commercial contracts for future delivery, nor when one
in order to satisfy his present wants borrows money at a high rate
of interest. The reason for this anomalous rule that the burden
is on him seeking to enforce the contract rests on public policy.
THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THESE CONTRACTS-ITS ORIGIN.
What is this public policy? How do these contracts tend to
injure the social fabric? To answer the question one must consider
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the political structure of England during the 17th and i8th cen-
turies, when the doctrine was first enunciated. England was slowly
emerging from a condition of qualified feudalism, introduced by
the Normans. Under the feudal law real property was in fact as
well as in name the royal property and was the foundation on which
the social fabric was built. Practically all land tenures rested on
actual or prescriptive grants from the crown. These grants had
been made for personal services rendered the crown and their
descent was ordinarily secured in the family of the grantee by
entails or analogous systems. The tenants in capite were bound
to the crown by personal loyalty and allegiance; the dignity of "him
whom the king delighteth to honor" was upheld by royal grants.
So we have a social structure in which the crown is upheld and
supported by the tenants in chief, who, secured in their position
and dignity by grants of land, are in turn upheld, formerly by vil-
leins bound to the land--adscripti glebae-in later days by their
tenantry, bound to them by tradition and personal loyalty, and over
whom they exercise a traditional and personal protection and
surveillance. The entire political mechanism was based upon land,
and the personality and identity of the tenants in chief in their
relation both to the crown and to the base tenantry were an essential
element thereof. Hence any alienation of land out of the family
was discountenanced by public policy, for it destroyed the traditional
and personal relation of the tenant in chief to the crown and the
tenantry and had so far weakened the social fabric; and if such
alienation might be made, public policy demanded that the alienor
should receive an exact quid pro quo, in order that he, whose
traditional duty it was to support the crown, might have the means
and ability to do so. Hence arose the rule that the consideration
must be full and adequate.
That the public policy underlying this rule is the policy of main-
taining landed estates in families is abundantly recognized by the
courts of England. "I apprehend that the protection of the court
with regard to reversionary interests was first from its tenderness
towards real property thrown round expectant heirs," said Lord
Hatherly in Tyler v. Yates, (L. R. 6 Ch. 665; 1878); and again in
O'Rorke v. Bolingbroke, (L. R. 2 App. Cas., 814; 1877),
he said: "It sufficiently appears that the principle on which equity
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originally proceeded to set aside such transactions was for the
protection of family property."'
In cases decided while the social conditions were such as we
have outlined, we find the point frequently urged that the severity
'In Cole v. Gibbons (3 P. Wins., 290), decided in 1734, Lord Taldtc
observed that it was "The policy of the nation to prevent what was a growing
mischief to ancient families, that of seducing an heir apparent from a de-
pendence on his ancestor who probably would have supported him, and by
feeding his extravagancies, tempting him in his father's lifetime, to -sell the
reversion of that estate which 'was settled upon him, forasmuch as this tended
to the manifest ruin of families, therefore the policy of the nation thought fit
(though it at first prevailed with some difficulty) to put a stop to so mis-
chievous a practice by setting aside all these bargains with young heirs."
"This doctrine appears to be founded in part on the policy maintaining
parental authority and preventing the waste of family estates, * * * and
in part on the equity of protecting against the designs of that calculating
rapacity which the law constantly discountenances, the distress frequently
incident to the owners of profitable reversions and the improvidence with
which men are commonly disposed to sacrifice the future to the present."
Reporter's note to Davis v. Duke of Marlborough, 2 Swan, Io8.
"One ground on which the Court emphatically and through a long series
of cases discouraged such transactions was because they enabled the heir to
destroy the family estate behind the back of those interested in seeing it
preserved, in order to gratify his caprice or supply the necessities created
through his caprice." Tynte v. Hodge, 13 Wldy. Rep. 172.
"As to the hazard which the purchaser ran: I have said that this Court
have always extended their relief in such cases and with the greatest justice
in the world for the sake of the puflic to prevent peoples gaining, as it were,
to the prejudice of young improvident persons and the ruin of famili."
Lord Chancellor Hardwicke in Barnardiston v. Lingood, 2 Atk., 1O3.
"The ill tendency of heirs contracting with strangers to furnish their
wants is to make them quit a regular family life and dependency, to withdraw
from advice and counsel of friends and to have youth supplied with the means
of gratifying their passions, and the bringing of people together on the woi'st
principles on which men may contract, avarice on one side, and a craving
appetite on the other. The greediness of gain is the only principle on which
a stranger can be induced to furnish a stranger; and the occasion of applying
to a stranger is, because the wants are such as he would not reveal to his
family, which tends to a delusion in what is of general concern, the provision
for posterity. A man mdy be giving his estate to a money-lender instead of
the person intended; and every one disguising the truth from a man who has
a fight to the truth, is wrong, and ought not to be encouraged; and by this
delusion he gives his estate to strangers, when he thinks he is giving to his
heirs or relations, and when, if he had known the truth, he would have
provided for that heir or relations, so as to prevent his beggaring himself.
This has been a growing practice" to supply young heirs, and the Court bas
extended its remedy." Burnett, J., in Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sr., 124.
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of the rule operates as a hardship on the expectant; -that if a full
and adequate consideration be essential to its validity it will be
next to impossible for him to find a purchaser. But we Eind at
that time, that this result is in the mind of the judges one of the
chiefest recommendations of the rule. It is with them purely a
question of public policy, which rises superior even to the needs
of the heir. In the year 716 we find Lord Cowper in Twistleton
v. Griffith, I P. Wins. 310, saying "that these bargains were corrupt
and fraudulent and tended to the destruction of heirs sent to town
for their education and to the utter ruin of families; and that the
relief of the court ought to be extended to meet with such corrupt
bargains and unconscionable practice. * * * His Lordship
added, he saw no inconvenience -in the objection that at this rate
an heir without difficulty could not sell a reversion. This might
force an heir to go home and submit to his father, or to bite on the
bridle and endure some hardships and in the meantime he might
grow wiser and be reclaimed."1
A CHANGE OF POLICY PRODUCED MY A CHANGE OF CONDITIONS.
But we find towards the beginning of the nineteenth century the
political fabric of England undergoing a marked change. Com-
merce has attacked and overthrown feudalism and land is no longer
the basis of the social structure. We find now a manufacturing
community and the great mass of the people deriving their sus-
tenance from the factories, not from the land. The crown has
lost the power which it possessed under the feudal system; it has
become an emblem, not a repository of sovereignty. The personal
loyalty and support of the tenants in capite to the crown are no
longer essential to the support of government; nor is the welfare
of the masses dependent upon the personal care and surveillance of
the landlord.
The alienation of lands now no longer has an injurious effect
upon the public weal. The sovereignty is no longer supported by
the loyalty of personal retainers; nor is it essential that the estates
of such retainers be jealously preserved- The element of personal
1"The tendency of this doctrine t6 render all bargains with such persons
very insecure, if not altogether impracticable, seems not to have been con-
sidered as operating to prevent its adoption and establishment, but, on the
contrary, some judges have avowed that probable consequence as being to
them the recommendation of the doctrine." Peacock v. Evans, 16 Ves. Jr.,
512.
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relationship has been eliminated from the political structure, so that
public policy ceases to demand its preservation.
And we find this change reflected upon the law. In the year
18io Sir William Grant, M. R., decided Gowland v. De Faria,
enunciating the rule, which strictly conformed to the equity prece-
dent of the times,' that a full and adequate consideration must be
paid and that the rule governing contracts of this class is "an ex-
ception to the general rule, that for mere inadequacy of value a
contract is not to be set aside." It was there held that the full
consideration required was the present value of the reversion as
calculated by an actuary-that is, an exact quid pro quo, the alienor
receiving back in another form exactly what he has conveyed away.
This we have already shown was strictly the public policy of those
times, and this policy overrode the best interests of the expectant
and the rights of the alienee. But public requirements and public
policy change, and we find that the rule of quid pro quo vanishes.
In the year 1825 Sir William Alexander in Headen v. Rosher
(i M'Clel. & Y. 89) thus commented on Gowland v. De Faria:
"Notwithstanding the very great respect I entertain for the great
judge who determined it, I cannot bring myself to adopt the prin-
ciple which he is reported to have laid down there. * * * The
price agreed on and actually paid was, in my opinion, the utmost
that according to every human probability could have been obtained.
I do not dispute Mr. Morgan's valuation; but the price put by the
actuary can never be procured in fact; the witnesses for the de-
fendant prove it, and it requires no witnesses. The price set was
the arithmetical value. Now no man will part with his ready money
and all the advantages which the power over it confers in exchange
for a future interest, without some compensation beyond the dry
arithmetical value of it. To set this bargain aside would be, in
effect, to decree that no valid bargain for a reversion can be made,
except by auction; and I do not know how any other sale of such
an interest can be sustained unless judges proceed on the same
principle as I do. This would be a very inconvenient restraint
on the power of the owners of such property."
Yet in 1827 we find a reversion to the rule in Gowland v. De
aNott v. Hill, 2 Vern., 167; Nott v. Johnson, 2 Vern., 27; Berny v. Pitt,
2 Vern., 14; Twistleton v. Griffith, I P. Wms., 31o; Peacock v. Evans, x6 Ves.
Jr., 5i; Lord Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sr., 124; Bowes v. Heaps, 3
Ves. & B., i17, ii9.
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Faria, Sir John Leach, M. R., allowing it with a great reluctance
in Hinksman v. Smith (3 Russ, 433): "Sir William Grant did not
consider himself as laying down a new rule but as following the
current of authority; and since that case, the rule has so far been
regarded as settled law of the court, that although I have upon
more than one occasion judicially questioned both the principle and
policy of the rule," yet it would not become this court to make a
precedent in direct opposition to it."
Subsequently, in 1832, in the case of Potts v. Curtis (i Younge,
543) Lord Lyndhurst followed the rule in Headen v. Rosher, and
it was also followed in Wardle v. Carter, 7 Sim., 490. In 1834 in
Bawtree v. Watson, 3 Myl. & K., 339, another reversal occurs and
the rule is enunciated "that the purchaser of a reversionary interest,
in order to support its title, must establish that the price paid was a
full consideration."
In 184o Lord Chancellor Cottenham in Earl of Alborough v.
Trye (7 Cl. & Fin., 436) and in 1852 Lord Justice Cranworth in
Edwards v. Burt (2 De G. M. & G., 55) declared for the fair market
price. But within the next ten years a decided reversal to the rule
in Gowland v. De Faria occurred in five cases decided by Sir John
Romilly,- which led Vice Chancellor Stuart to remark, in Willoughby
v. Brideoke (1W Wkly. Rep., 515): "The law on the subject of
the sale of reversionary interests by private contract, as it is to be
gathered from the later authorities, is to be read with great regret.
The case of Edzwards v. Burt as decided by the lords justices
(reversing the decree of the master of the rolls in favor of the
defendant) has necessarily produced a series of decisions, the logical
climax of which is found in Foster v. Roberts, where the master of
"'The principle and-policy of this rule may be both equally questionable.
Sellers of reversions are not necessarily in the power of those with whom
they contract, and are not necessarily exposed to hard terms; and persons
who sell their expectancies and reversions from the pressure of distress are
thrown, by the rule, into the hands of those who are likely to take advantage
of their situation; for no person can securely deal with them." Sir John
Leach in Shelly v. Nash, 3 Madd., 232 (188). "The plaintiff's counsel first
insisted that he was entitled to be relieved on the ground of the purchase
being of a reversion, unless the defendant could show that the purchase was
for an adequate consideration. The policy of this rule as to reversions may
well be doubted." Sir John Leach in Wood v. Abrey, 3 Madd., 417.
'Boothby v. Boothby, i5 Beav., 212 (1852) ; Salter v. Bradshaw, 26 Beav.,
x61 (1858); Foster v. Roberts, 29 Beav., 467 (i86o); Jones v. Ricketts, 31
Beav., 130 (1862); Nesbit v. Berridge, 32 Beav., 282 (1863).
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the rolls says that according to the present doctrine of the court,
unless a person gives much more than the value, it is impossible to
purchase a reversionary interest with safety, except under a sale
by auction. That is the result of the decision in Edwards v. Burt;
it is a result shocking to the understanding of every lawyer and
man of sense."
THE STATUTE 31 VIC., CH. 4, DECLARATORY OF THE NEW COMMON LAW.
We believe that the decisions of Sir William Alexander and
Lord Lyndhurst were directly inspired by the change in public
conditions, at that time most noticeable, but they were not strong
enough to withstand the weight of the precedent of centuries and
were overwhelmed. The changed demands of public policy were,
however, recognized by Parliament, and in the year 1867 an act
was passed "to amend the law as administered in Courts of Equity
with respect to sales of reversions," (31 Vic., Ch. 4), in which it
was enacted that "No purchase made bona fide and without fraud or
unfair dealing of any reversionary interest in real or personal estate
shall hereafter be opened or set aside merely on the ground of
under-value." This act was but the legislative recognition of the
fact that public policy no longer demanded that the condition and
state of the landed families should be maintained. It established
the law exactly as it was declared by Sir William Alexander in
1825.
THE EFFECT OF THE OLD PUBLIC POLICY ON THE MODERN LAW.
The presumption against the validity of these contracts arose
naturally and solely from the public interest in them, but so directly
did the presumption operate for the benefit of the expectant, that we
frequently find that result mistaken for the reason of the rule. The
social structure has gradually changed and public policy has been
modified accordingly. The public being no longer interested in the
maintenance of the status of the tenant in chief, the right to sell
is simply a personal one in which public policy is not concerned.
But equity has not forgotten the beneficent result of the old rule
to the expectant. The benevolent- habit is not easily shaken off.
He is still sheltered and protected and the presumption against these
contracts is still maintained, but now, not for the benefit of the
public but of the expectant. That which was once an incident has
become an end, and he who would enforce the contract must show
that he exercised no fraud, oppression or undue advantage in its
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procuring, and that the expectant received the best price obtainable
in reason. As we have already quoted: "I apprehend that the
protection of the court with regard to reversionary interests was
first from its tenderness towards real property thrown round ex-
pectant heirs." (Tyler v. Yates, L. R., 6 Ch., 665.) This gradual
shifting of the favor of the presumption from the public to the
expectant was undoubtedly produced in large measure by a long line
of decisions in which a young and profligate heir has squandered
away his patrimony in vice and excess, has fallen among thieves
and money lenders and has sold his birthright for a mess of pottage.
The disadvantage of his position in making such conveyances ap-
pealed strongly to equity.
But throughout all these cases we find the expression that equity
avoids such contracts in cases of disadvantageous position of vendor,
fraud, oppression and undue advantage, on the ground of public
policy.' This expression is -confusing, misleading and inaccurate.
Public policy and the policy of the law are not synonymous terms.
The term policy of the law is a synonym of justice and natural
equity. Public policy is called into play only when the relief sought
to be obtained is a menace to public security, although just and
fair as between the parties to the controversy. In cases where such
circumstances appear, it is unfair and inequitable to the individual
to enforce the contract, but such a decree would not threaten public
security. Relief is granted under the general policy of the law,
under the usual rules of equitable jurisprudence, in cases of actual
or constructive fraud.2
'Twistleton v. Griffith, i P. Wins., 310 (1716); Barmardiston v. Lingood,
2 Atk., i33 (r74o); Chesterfield v. .Tanssen, 2 Ves. Sr., 124 (i75oY; Peacock
v. Evans, i6 Ves. Jr., 512 (1io); Shelly v. Nash, 3 Madd., 232 (1818); Davis
v. Duke of Marlborough, 2 Swan., xo8 (I819); Ryle v. Swindells, i M'ClelI,
519 (1824); Bawtree v. Watson, 3 Myl. & K., 339 (1834); King v. Hamlet, 2
Myl. & K., 456 (1834); Earl of Aylesford v. Morris, L. RL, 8 Ch., 484 (1873);
St. Albyn v. Harding, 27 Beav., i (1879); Brenchly v. Higgins, 7o L. J. CL.,
iSS.
2"The relief is founded in part upon the policy of maintaining parental
and quasi-parental authority and preventing the waste of family estates. It
is also founded in part upon an enlarged equity flowing from the principles
of natural justice." Story, Eq. Junis., Sec. 335; Wolmesley v. Booth, 2 Atk.,
27, A.
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THE RULE THAT THE PRESUMPTION IS AGAINST THE VALIDITY OF
THESE CONTRACTS.
The only rule which public policy evolved in such cases was
that of full consideration. As we have already shown, the policy
of the crown demanded that the position of the crown tenants in
whom it found its support should be maintained. Courts of equity,
as prerogative courts (Story, Eq. Juris., Sec. 44), were peculiarly
susceptible to the influence of the crown policy. Hence arose their
"tenderness toward real property," and the ancient rule of full
consideration applied in actions for specific performance of contracts
to convey, entered into not only by the reversioner but by the tenant
in possession. (Pomeroy on Contracts, Sec, 194.) As long as the
rule of full consideration existed, the questions of disadvantageous
position, fraud, etc., could not arise, for if the consideration were
in fact full, such circumstances could not exist; if it were not full,
the contract was invalid independently of their existence. It was
only when the conditions changed and the rule of fair consideration
sprang into being that these circumstances became material. The
rule of full consideration carried with it, as a necessary and essential
incident, the unusual presumption against the validity of the con-
tract. Conditions changed, the public ceased to concern itself with
such contracts, but the presumption remained, illogical, misplaced
and abnormal. When this class of cases is considered apart from
the corpus of the law, the presumption appears at first blush equit-
able, but its supporting reason is specious and inconsonant with
the general rules of equity. Every day persons contract from posi-
tions of even greater disadvantage. The holder of unimproved
land, burdened with mortgages and taxes, seeks to sell in order to
discharge these debts. His condition is open, notorious and of
public record. The prospective vendee has every advantage; yet
from their positions does not arise any presumption of unfair deal-
ing. The burden is on the vendor seeking to rescind to show fraud.
The anomalous presumption can be explained only upon the one
theory: that it was originally demanded by the public policy of
feudalism. Reading these cases from the standpoint of to-day and
in the light of history, it becomes apparent that the presumption is
but a surviving fragment of a shattered system, a rule of which the
reason is dead.
The doctrine of the expectant's disadvantageous position reaches
its logical and most absurd climax in Bromley v. Smith (26 Beav.,
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644; 1859), where Sir John Romilly, M. R., holds that the facts
"that the plaintiff was a man of mature age and * * * that
he perfectly understood the nature and extent of the transaction, do
not, whether taken separately or conjointly, disentitle the plaintiff
to relief"; and in Tynte v. Hodge (13 Wkly. Rep., 172; 1864),
where Vice Chancellor Wood holds that "although Colonel Tynte
was forty-seven years of age, and had had some considerable ex-
perience in borrowing money, nevertheless in an investigation of
this description he must be regarded as the unprotected heir, whom
the Court of Chancery always favored."
THE CAUSE OF ITS CONTINUANCE.
Why was this archaic presumption continued after public policy
had ceased to demand it? Why does the law create a relation of
trust and confidence between the expectant and his prospective
alienee and not between one who contracts to sell his next year's
crop and the intending purchaser? Why should it say that his
position is presumptively disadvantageous and does not raise the
same presumption in the case of all borrowers? Why does the
law insist that the bargain must be advantageous to the expectant
before it can be enforced and does not so insist in the case of other
bargains? Why does the law create a relationship which
does not in fact exist and presume that he who has
bargained for a reversion has been guilty of fraud? The answer
is clear. Because before the day of England's commercial activity,
when the vast majority of landowners lived upon the land and from
the land, when their sons were not seeking capital in order to
engage in business, practically the only reason for raising money
upon a reversion was to expend it in dissipation or to relieve a
present necessity. The profligate and the man weighed down by
necessity were certainly at a disadvantage in so contracting. It
was a presumption of fact, based upon the common experience and
observation of mankind in those days, that the alienor of an ex-
pectancy was in a position of disadvantage.
But with the increase of commercial activity, young men are at
least as apt to attempt to raise moley upon any security which they
can give for the purpose of engaging in business and the serious
pursuits of life as for the purposes of profligacy or the payment of
burdening debts. Certainly to-day our common experience and
observation raise no such presumption in fact, and it is with an
absolute shock that we read that "although Colonel Tynte was
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forty-seven years of age, and had had some considerable experience
in borrowing money, nevertheless in investigations of this descrip-
tion, he must be regarded as an unprotected heir."
THE RULE IS DISAPPEARING.
Has the law changed to conform to changed conditions? Is the
presumption in favor of or adverse to such contracts? The note
of change has been sounded in England. In the year 1871 in the
case of Tyler v. Yates (L. R. 6 Ch., 665), Lord Hatherly said:
"It was supposed that no person, whatever his age, was competent
to deal with reversioners. The law, however, has been recently
changed [31 Vic., Ch. IV], and it has been decided by the Legis-
lature that these bargains shall be as free as others." And in z875
Vice Chancellor Bacon said in Judd v. Green (45 L. J. Eq., N. S.,
io8): "It may be right that a needy, improvident youth who
desires to raise money upon his expectancy for the purpose of dis-
charging debts contracted in his nonage, or furnishing him with
the means of indulging in luxury and extravagance, ought to be
protected against the sordid and corrupt practices of persons who
seek to make a profit out of such a man's inexperience. But this
principle must be, as it has always been, applied with great caution,
and it has never yet been held that an expectant heit was incom-
petent to deal with his interest for substantial purposes, or that the
persons dealing with him could have their transactions impeached
unless there was something immorally wrong so as to- make it neces-
sary to discountenance their dealings on the ground of public policy.
* * * In this case the plaintiff * * * desired to raise"
money with which he might procure admission as partner to some
established bisiness. There is certainly nothing unlawful or im-
prudent in that. On his introduction to Hathaway his first object
was to raise money, and his second to employ the money when raised
in a proper, beneficial manner. I fail therefore to see how the fact
of hs youth,, or his being entitled to an estate in reversion, can by
themselves affect the case. If indeed he had been imposed on by
the fraud and deceit of the persons with whom he engaged, that
might entitle him to relief, but not other or more than he might ham
claimed whatcver might have been his age or whatever the nature of
his interest."
But only recently (19O1) Lord Justice Rigby said in Brenchly
v. Higgins (7o L. J., Ch., 778): "As I understand it, the law was
that in dealing with expectant heirs (and the plaintiff in this case
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comes within that description) al" persons, whether they were
money lenders or not, were bound to show and had the onus thrown
upon them of proving the absence of fraud or unfair dealing. I
do not consider that this act of Parliament in the least alters that."
See also Earl of Aylesford v. Morris (L. R., 8 Ch., 484; 1873).
Is this last case a reversal to the old rule or its dying flicker?
Is the rule in Tyler v. Yates and Judd v. Green a prophetic light
which burns for a short time and then goes out, as did Headen v.
Rasher? Will it necessitate a legislative act to establish these con-
tracts on the same basis as all contracts for future sale? That the
conditions of to-day demand such a rule, that the unhampered power
of alienation of all possible assets and securities is a business neces-
sity, cannot be doubted. That the tendency is towards considering
these contracts presumptively fair and placing the burden of proving
disadvantage of position, fraud, oppression and undue advantage
upon those who would rescind them or oppose their performance
is apparent. This tendency is irresistible. How long precedent and
conservatism will prevent its unqualified recognition by the courts
of England is problematic. Perhaps its full recognition can be
secured only by act of Parliament, but none the less certainly it
must come, because it is demanded by the conditions of to-day and
by public policy, now in fact changed to conform to those conditions.
It may be interesting in this connection to note the old case of
Nichols v. Gould (2 Ves. Sr., 423), decided in 1751 by Lord Hard-
wicke, in which the question of public policy and the resulting favor
to the heir was not considered. This case stands quite apart from
the decisions of that time ard of many years later, but is interesting
as a true expression of the law of such contracts when the question
of public policy is eliminated, as we contend it is to-day. He said:
"The plaintiff was a poor dragoon, entitled to a reversion in fee of
a small estate after the death of a tenant for life; to whose first
and every other son there was a remainder, but who then had no son
nor was married. Defendant purchased this reversion; tenant for
life died in about a month after. The bill was to set aside this
conveyance as being at an under-value.
"There is no proof of any fraud or imposition on the plaintiff,
nothing but suspicion, and therefore it is too much to set aside this
purchase merely on the value. Every purchase of this kind must
be on the foot of great uncertainty as to the value. * * * Then
will a court of equity, after the contingency has fallen out one way,
enter into consideration of the value? If indeed there was any
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degree of fraud or imposition the court would come at it and set it
aside; but there is none. The plaintiff was in the best situation to
know the value, not being at a distance from the estate or from the
tenant for life or his family. Looking on the event, it was pur-
chased at an under-value; but had he lived longer and had children,
it had been different. It is asked, Where is the harm, because
defendant will have his money again? But I cannot set it aside
without making him pay costs; and that argument might be made
use of on every advantageous purchase, that he might have his
principal and interest again. * * * These kind of purchases.
are a sort of chance; it is too hard to come at it, unless there was
any proof- of fraud or imposition, which then the court would lay
hold of. Let the bill be dismissed."
THE SOURCES OF THE RULE IN AMERICA.
In regard to the rule in America, we find it directly based upon
Judge Story's work on equity jurisprudence. (Secs. 333-349). That
the work of a writer of such pre-eminent ability should have fixed
and established the law in this country is a matter of congratulation,
not of complaint. But it is to be borne in mind that this work was
written in the year 1835, when the doctrine of public policy and
the rule of full consideration were still prevalent in England. This
portion of the work was based entirely on the English case law;
not a single American authority is cited in the original edition.
Judge Story wrote of the law as he found it, yet, doubting the
policy and principle of the rule which fixed the presumption against
the validity of the contract, quoting with approval Sir John Leach's
dictum in Shelley v. Nash. (Sec. 338.)
THE PUBLIC POLICY OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA COMPARED.
We have shown that the attitude of equity in regard to these
contracts has since judge Story's time undergone a marked change
in England, due to changed conditions. Judge Story wrote only
of the law of England. The conditions which produced the rule
in England have never existed in America. The public policy of
this country has never favored the retention of landed estates in
families, but has treated land as the subject of trade and encouraged
its facile alienation. The social conditions in America have never
been such as to engender the presumption of profligacy or debt
from the fact that an expectant endeavors to raise money on his
expectancy. As Judge Story himself wrote: "Sellers of reversions
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are not necessarily in the power of those with whom they contract,
and are not necessarily exposed to imposition and hard terms."
(Story, Eq. Juris., Sec. 338.) The cases decided in this country
are few in number, and follow without question the English prece-
dents of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In all of
them the guidance of that deus ex machina, Public Policy, is in-
voked, but in none of them is it considered what is the public
policy of to-day and of America towards these contracts. What is
its basis? What is its reason? The policy of our people and our
times should control the law of such contracts in this country-not
the policy of mediaeval and feudal England.
Thomas H. Breeze.
